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 Abstracts—This paper proposes a modified long-run 
incremental cost pricing (LRIC) method for distribution network 
pricing considering the diversified contributions of network users 
to system peak. The Shapley-value method and modified 
coincident factor method are used to determine network users’ 
various contributions. The comparison between original LRIC 
and the Modified LRIC indicates the positive correlation between 
the contribution to system peak and network charges for different 
network users. This paper also explores the potential users’ 
behavior to gain bill reductions according to the cooperate-game 
theory and the consequential network investment deferral.  
Index Terms—Network pricing, Long-run-incremental-cost 
pricing, Shapley value, coincident factor, Contributions.   
 
Ⅰ. INTRODUCTION 
  Network pricing methods are designed to recover network 
reinforcement cost and certain level revenue for network 
operators. An advanced pricing method should be able to send 
end-users clear signals of network congestion, and network 
users can adjust their network usage behaviors according to 
financial signals. This can lead to system stresses alleviated and 
deferral of network reinforcement. 
  Currently, the mainly used pricing methods for transmission 
and distribution network are Distribution reinforcement model 
(DRM), investment-cost-relative pricing (ICRP), long-run-
incremental-cost (LRIC) [1]. DRM averages network costs at 
each voltage level. ICRP sets network charges by using the 
capacity of lines and distances of supply points. In LRIC, the 
incremental cost is calculated based on network maximum 
capacity and annual peak utilization [2]. However, none of 
aforementioned methods consider that various network users 
have different peak load characteristics and individual peak load 
may not coincide with each other or the system peak.  
  Under current LRIC pricing arrangement, at each nodal level, 
a demand node of very low level at system peak period is 
charged according to the same system peak utilization level 
compared to other larger contributors. Under a demand node, 
where network users can be categorized into classes with 
different criteria and have diversified contributions to network 
components, but various loads are charged at the same unit 
price. Therefore, it is reasonable to reconsider network pricing 
methods by respecting diversified contributions of various loads 
to upstream networks peak utilization that defines future 
network investment. 
  Paper [3] presents a new method for determining the 
contributions of each load to the power flow through each line 
in an electrical-power system. The main idea of computation 
algorithm is to determine the extraction factors of each load 
node from the lines incident to it, then moving backward, 
propagating these extraction factors to the lines in the upstream 
direction up to source nodes. 
  Paper [4] proposes a coincident demand based smart long run 
incremental cost (LRIC) pricing mechanism. Coincidence 
factor, which is defined as the fraction of network user’s demand 
at upstream asset peak usage to user’s individual peak demand, 
is reflective of user’s contribution to network component usage. 
The coincident demand is used as power flow input to 
accommodate actual asset usage. Compared to original LRIC 
pricing mechanism, all network users will obtain network 
charges reduction at different extents depending on their 
contributions to network asset usage. Paper [5] proposes an 
enhanced LRIC pricing mechanism based on the contribution of 
generation and load located at various nodes, to network peak of 
each upstream asset, the contribution is modeled as a load-to-
asset contribution factor (LACF) and generation-to-asset 
contribution factor (GACF) for load and generation users 
respectively, to assess the impact of user contributions during 
peak load on network investment. 
Shapley value based on cooperative game theory is a well-
established concept in common cost allocation and contribution 
determination [6]. There are several transmission-related 
allocation methods based on the Shapley Value. Paper [7] 
provides a transmission loss allocation method based on 
equivalent injection current. Similar to power flow analysis, the 
proposed method uses current injection analysis to determine 
the voltage contribution of each network user on network 
components. The Shapley Value is used for final transmission 
loss allocation. Paper[8]-[9] propose similar method using 
Shapley Value to allocate transmission cost incurred to 
accommodate all the loads, where the method overcomes the 
drawback of conventionally used methods such as postage-
stamp method and MW-miles method, encouraging the 
economically optimal usage of transmission facilities. Proposed 
Shapley value methods distribute the common cost of 
cooperation based upon the assumption that the cost proportion 
of a participant in a coalition is determined by the incremental 
cost that the participant generates by joining the coalition.  
This paper uses Shapley value of cooperative game theory to 
calculate the expected marginal contribution of diversified loads 
on the utilization of each network asset, then determines 
contribution coefficients based on coincident factor concept, 
and finally uses modified utilization levels as input to calculate 
Long-run-incremental cost from each network component to 
load. Comparison between original LRIC pricing method and 
the proposed method illustrates that large contributors to system 
peak is responsible for higher network charges while small 
contributors will be rewarded by lower charges. The strong 
incentive to network users can guide them to modify demand 
pattern. The analysis of users’ strategies proves that by 
cooperative demand pattern adjustment, all active participants 
will obtain network charges reduction and system utilization is 
alleviated, resulting in network reinforcement deferral.  
 
Ⅱ. MATHAMATICAL FORMULATION OF MODIFIED 
LRIC  
a) LRIC pricing method  
  In electricity networks, the time to reinforcement horizon 𝑛𝑗 
can be determined from the actual power flow peak level (𝑃𝑗) 
and the capacity (𝐶𝑗) of network asset j. The present value (𝑃𝑉𝑗) 
of future reinforcement can be calculated according to asset cost 
and the reinforcement horizon: 
                   𝑛𝑗 =
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑗−𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑗
log⁡(1+𝑟)
                (1)                   
                𝑃𝑉𝑗 =
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑗
(1+𝑑)
𝑛𝑗
                  (2) 
Where 𝑟 is the load growth rate; 𝑑 is the discount rate. 
Resulting from the incremental power withdraw (∆𝑃𝑁) at node 
N, the incremental cost of network asset j can be determined by 
the power flow change along the network asset (∆𝑃𝑗). 
            𝑛𝑗𝑛𝑒𝑤 =
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑗−𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑗+∆𝑃𝑗)
log⁡(1+𝑟)
           (3)           
              𝑃𝑉𝑗𝑛𝑒𝑤 =
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑗
(1+𝑑)
𝑛𝑗𝑛𝑒𝑤
               (4)                   
Where 𝑛𝑗𝑛𝑒𝑤  and 𝑃𝑉𝑗𝑛𝑒𝑤  are new asset investment horizon 
and the present value with additional power withdrawn or 
injection.  
The change in the present value as a result of the nodal injection 
or withdrawn is given by  
             ∆𝑃𝑉𝑗 = 𝑃𝑉𝑗𝑛𝑒𝑤 − 𝑃𝑉𝑗                (5) 
The annualized incremental cost (IC) of the network component 
j is the difference in the present value of the future investment 
as a result of ∆𝑃𝑁 at node N multiplied by an annuity factor 
             𝐼𝐶𝑗 = ∆𝑃𝑉𝑗 × 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙⁡𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟        (6) 
Therefore, for the network, the long-run incremental cost to 
support node N (𝐿𝑅𝐼𝐶𝑁) can be determined by  
                𝐿𝑅𝐼𝐶𝑁 =
∑ 𝐼𝐶𝑗𝑗
∆𝑃𝑁
                 (7) 
b) Shapley value 
  A cooperative game theoretic approach based on Shapley 
Value is used here to determine the expected marginal 
contribution of diversified loads to the utilization of network 
components in the distribution system. The Shapley value is a 
method which divides the value of a coalition between the 
players of that coalition based on their contribution to the value 
of coalition. Since the contribution of players on the value of a 
coalition depends on the selection order of players, some 
situations may appear that symmetric players in a game acquire 
different values. To handle this problem, Shapley uses averages 
over all possible permutations of players to calculate the value, 
which is called Shapley value. Let 𝛱𝑁  denotes the set of all 
possible permutations of network users: ⁡{1, … ,𝑁} . For a 
permutation ⁡π ∈ 𝛱𝑁 , 𝑆𝜋
𝑖  denotes the set of users that are 
predecessors of user i in the π. In a cooperative game G with N 
players and the characteristic function σ, Shapley value for user 
class i is calculated as:  
         𝑆𝑉𝑖 =
1
𝑁!
∑ 𝜎(𝑆𝜋
𝑖 ∪ {𝑖}) − σ(𝑆𝜋
𝑖 )⁡𝜋∈𝛱𝑁          (8) 
Where the characteristic function σ here is the peak demand 
level of a network asset. 
The summation over different permutations considers all 
possible coalitions in the game. This Shapley value indicates the 
expected marginal contribution of each network user. 
c) Modified Coincident Factor (Contribution Coefficient) 
Coincident factor (CF) indicates that how the peak demand of 
an individual load coincides to the peak utilization of an 
upstream network asset, calculated as: 
                   𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑗 =
𝐷𝑖𝑗
𝐷
𝑖
𝑝                      (9) 
Where 𝐷𝑖𝑗  is the demand level of load i at network asset j peak 
time, 𝐷𝑖𝑗
𝑝
 is the peak demand level of individual load i. 
Here this paper proposes a novel method to calculate the 
contribution of diversified loads to system peak, which is called 
contribution coefficient (CC). The contribution coefficient is the 
fraction of the actual contribution to the expected marginal 
contribution:   
                    𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑗 =
𝐷𝑖𝑗
𝑎𝑝
𝐷𝑖𝑗
𝑆𝑉                  (10) 
Where 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑗 is the contribution coefficient of load i to network 
asset j,  𝐷𝑖𝑗
𝑎𝑝
 is the actual power flow induced by load i at peak 
time of network asset j, presenting the actual contribution of 
load i to peak utilization of network asset j, 𝐷𝑖𝑗
𝑆𝑉 is the expected 
marginal contribution of load i to peak utilization of network 
asset j which is calculated via Shapley method. 
If CC>1, the load is large contributor, vice versus, and if CC=1, 
the load is average contributor. 
d) Modified LRIC 
To determine the LRIC with diversified load classes under 
various nodes, firstly power flow analysis is used to determine 
the utilization of network components and the actual power 
flows along networks induced by each load, then contribution 
coefficient matrix is obtained by using equation (8) and (10). 
Changes of power flows ∆𝑃𝑗 cross each network asset due to 
the incremental demand (∆𝑃𝑁) of the node N is calculated by 
power flow analysis. Then the contribution coefficients as 
weights are multiplied by actual power flow at the peak level on 
each network asset: 
                    𝑃𝑖𝑗 = 𝑃𝑗 × 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑗               (11) 
Where 𝑃𝑗 is actual power flow peak level cross network asset 
j, 𝑃𝑖𝑗  is the modified power flow peak level cross network asset 
j considering the contribution of the load i under. 
The reinforcement horizon of network asset j and new 
reinforcement horizon for various loads due to incremental 
demand are determined as: 
                  𝑛𝑗 =
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑗−𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑗
log⁡(1+𝑟)
               (12) 
               𝑛𝑗𝑛𝑒𝑤 =
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑗−𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑖𝑗+∆𝑃𝑗)
log⁡(1+𝑟)
           (13) 
Overall LRIC for load i is calculated by using equations (12)-
(13) and equations (5)-(7) 
Ⅲ. DEMONSTRATION 
a) System description  
A distribution system with five buses and five branches is 
used to demonstrate. For simplicity, here only distribution lines 
as sole network component on this distribution system are 
considered and the rest of network assets can be analysed by 
same method proposed in this paper. System topology is shown 
is fig.1. There are three demand nodes in system. Node 1 and 
node 2 comprise singular class of load, representing industry 
user (load 1) and small business user (load 2) respectively. Node 
3 has two differed classes of load, where class 1 is categorized 
as domestic unrestricted user and class 2 is domestic user with 
smart meters [10]. Load profiles in the system are shown is fig.2.  
Fig. 1 Demo distribution system 
Fig.2 Load profiles at various nodes 
 
Demand peaks of loads in node 1 and node 2 occur in the mid 
of the day while load in node 3 class 1 peaks at early evening 
and load in node 4 class 2 reaches peak level at late night. 
b) LRIC implementation  
From available load data at various nodes, the power flow 
cross each distribution lines can be determined and power flow 
contribution from each load can be calculated by power flow 
analysis. DC power flow is applied to the demonstration.                     
The expected marginal contributions of each load at each 
distribution line is calculated from equation (8), and the 
contribution coefficients are calculated by using equation (10).  
Table.1 shows the contribution coefficients of each load at each 
distribution line. 
 
Table.1 Contribution coefficients matrix 
Contribution 
coefficient  
Node 1 Node 2 Node 3  
Load 1 Load2 class 1 class 2 
D1 1.0070 0.9612 1.0976 0.9345 
D2 1.0343 1.0381 0.8350 0.7042 
D3 0.7077 0.8843 1.1713 0.8113 
D4 0.9216 0.9947 0.9493 0.8261 
D5 0.7984 0.9209 1.2030 0.9020 
 
Fig.3 Power flow on (a) D2 and (b) D5 and contributions from loads for 
example  
The modified power flow peak levels of distribution lines varies 
from load contributions, rather than are the same for all network 
users, calculated by using equation (11). The branch incremental 
cost and nodal LRIC then can be calculated by equations (12)-
(13) and equations (5)-(7). Annual factor, load growth rate and 
discount rate are assumed to be 0.074, 1.6% and 6.9% 
respectively. Network asset cost are assumed to be D1 £ 12m, 
D2 & D5 £ 6m and D3 & D4 £ 3m. Results are presented in 
table 2. 
Table.2 Branch IC and nodal LRIC 
Incremental charges 
(£/yr/MW) 
Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 
Load 1 Load 2 class 1 class 2 
D1 14051.2 12105.5 18514.9 11061.3 
D2 8070.4 4824.6 829.3 480.6 
D3 -277.6 1527.1 1293.3 399.1 
D4 743.9 2713.3 -753.0 -482.3 
D5 1162.9 5236.1 19905.1 7917.3 
LRIC 23750.9 26406.6 39789.6 19376.0 
 
The result indicates that network charges of D1 and D5 is 
highest to load in node 3 class 1 while charges of D2 and charges 
of D3 and D4 are highest to load 1 and load 2 respectively. 
Negative charges occurs when the demand of loads alleviate 
network utilizations. 
c) Result analysis  
a
a 
b
a 
Table.3 presents the branch and total LRIC based on the 
original algorithm.  
Table.3 Branch IC and nodal LRIC under original algorithm 
Incremental charges 
(£/yr/MW) 
Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 
D1 13740.9 13740.9 13740.9 
D2 7244.5 4280.1 1477.6 
D3 -840.9 2262.9 779.5 
D4 966.1 2759.8 -889.7 
D5 2391.9 6817.3 11014.9 
LRIC 23502.5 29861.0 26123.2 
 
In the original method, LRIC prices defer at nodal level 
however diversified load classes under one demand node share 
a unit price. The comparison indicates that considering that 
diversified loads have different contributions on each network 
asset, large peak contributors will be responsible for higher 
network charges, vice versus. For load 1, network charges of D1 
and D2 increase 2.5% and 11.4%, charges of D4 and D5 
decrease by 23% and 51.4%. Since load 2 does small 
contribution to D1, D3, D4 and D5 and network charges only 
increase at D2 by 12.7%, overall network charge reduces by 
11.6%. For load class 1, contribution coefficients at D1, D3 and 
D5 are larger than 1, network charges on those branches rise up 
34.7%, 65.9% and 80.7% compared to those from the original 
LRIC pricing method. For load class 2, the contribution 
coefficients are all less than 1 and therefore the users at load 
class 2 will receive a large network charge reduction because of 
the less system contribution, where overall reduction is 25.8%.  
Fig.4 Branch LRIC at node 3 for example 
 
IV. NETWORK USER’ ENERGY MANAGEMENT 
STRATEGY 
Under the corporate game theory, users’ strategy will 
significantly affect the final payoff of each network user. The 
proposed pricing method offers network users the opportunities 
to adjust their usage pattern to acquire bill reduction and 
benefits. 
From table.1, users fall in load class 1 under node 3 would be 
the first to change their usage pattern trigged by high LRIC 
charges on network asset D1 and D5. Assume users in class 1 
shift their peak time to one hour later, the LRIC then is shown 
in table.4. 
Table.4 Branch IC and nodal LRIC with load class 1 peak time shift 
Incremental charges 
(£/yr/MW) 
Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 
Load 1  Load 2  class 1  class 2 
D1 31252.4 11066.9 6839.6 3270.0 
D2 8139.2 4718.8 867.3 468.4 
D3 -297.3 1557.2 1340.1 414.1 
D4 737.4 2686.1 -773.1 -473.4 
D5 1192.2 5136.1 19071.9 7745.1 
LRIC 41023.8 25165.2 27345.8 11424.1 
 
From results, it can be observed that users under load3 class1 
have a significant branch incremental charge reduction (63%) 
on D1 and moderate reduction (4%) on D5 due to peak hour shift 
by load3 class1, and the overall LRIC is largely reduced 
(31.2%). Meanwhile the branch incremental charge of load1 on 
D1 increases by 122.4% and overall LRIC surges to £ 41023.8, 
which is because D1 peak time is shifted from hour 34 to hour 
23 where load 1 becomes the largest contributor to D1 peak. 
Fig.5 Power flow on D1 (a) with and (b) without peak time shift 
In corporate game theory, users in load1 obtain the information 
that users in load3 class1 would conduct 1 hour peak shift, 
which will significantly increase the network charges to load 1, 
and then countermeasure would be taken by users in load 1. 
Assuming users in load1 shave peak duration demand by 7%, 
the resultant LRIC is shown in table.5.  
 
Table.5 Branch IC & nodal LRIC with load class 1 peak time shift and load 1 
peak load shave   
Incremental charges 
(£/yr/MW) 
Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 
Load1 Load 2  class 1  class 2  
D1 10517.8 9415.1 16992.4 13529.5 
D2 7039.9 4045.3 745.1 401.3 
D3 -325.3 1578.9 1387.8 426.3 
D4 654.1 2400.0 -693.8 -424.1 
D5 1298.8 5133.0 18881.7 7678.5 
LRIC 19185.3 22572.4 37313.2 21611.6 
b 
Compared with the results in table 2, both active demand users 
who conduct demand pattern adjustment benefit from lower 
network charges, overall network charges reduce by 19.2% and 
6.2% to load 1 and load class 1, but the rest of network users are 
not guaranteed for benefits or losses because their contribution 
coefficients are related to active users’ energy management 
strategies. Based on the strategies from users in node 1 and node 
3 class 1, peak utilizations of most of network components 
decrease, which indicates most network assets reinforcement 
can be deferred.  
Fig.6 Network utilization with and without users’ energy management  
 
In reality, diversified loads have various demand response 
limitations to conduct demand adjustment, and the optimal 
demand adjustment for each network user should be analysed 
among all network users cooperatively. Minimal network 
utilization level with minimal network charges can be used as 
the objective function to determine the optimal demand 
strategies in terms of Nash-equivalent based on game theory. 
The comprehensive optimization process is beyond this paper 
and will be explored in the future work.  
Ⅴ. CONCLUSION 
This paper proposes a new network pricing method based on 
LRIC pricing method combining the diversified load 
contributions to upstream systems peak demand levels. Shapley 
value method and modified coincident factor concept are used 
to determine the contribution of diversified loads. A distribution 
system with 3 demand nodes and 4 load clusters is tested. The 
numerical results clearly indicate that larger contributors at 
network utilization peak receive strong incentives to change 
their usage patterns by a high pricing signal, and small 
contributors will benefit from lower network charges.  
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